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Abstract
Market-based instruments such as payments, auctions or tradable permits have been proposed as flexible and cost-
effective instruments for biodiversity conservation on private lands. Trading the service of conservation requires one
to define a metric that determines the extent to which a conserved site adds to the regional conservation objective.
Yet, while markets for conservation are widely discussed and increasingly applied, little research has been conducted on
explicitly accounting for spatial ecological processes in the trading. In this paper, we use a coupled ecological-economic
simulation model to examine how spatial connectivity may be considered in the financial incentives created by a market-
based conservation scheme. Land use decisions, driven by changing conservation costs and the conservation market, are
simulated by an agent-based model of land users. On top of that, a metapopulation model evaluates the conservational
success of the market. We find that optimal spatial incentives for agents correlate with species characteristics such as
the dispersal distance, but they also depend on the spatio-temporal distribution of conservation costs. We conclude that
a combined analysis of ecological and socio-economic conditions should be applied when designing market instruments
to protect biodiversity.
Keywords: market-based instruments, biodiversity conservation, ecological-economic modelling, tradable permits,
payments, spatial incentives
1. Introduction
Market-based instruments such as payments (Wunder,
2007; Drechsler et al., 2007), auctions (Latacz-Lohmann
and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998) or biodiversity offset trad-
ing (Panayotou, 1994; Chomitz, 2004) have been suggested
as a means to complement existing reserves by inducing
biodiversity protection on private lands. Market-based
instruments are currently being used or tested in many
countries around the world. Some examples are conser-
vation and wetland mitigation banking in the US (Salz-
man and Ruhl, 2000; Wilcove and Lee, 2004; Fox and
Nino-Murcia, 2005) or markets schemes in Australia (Cog-
gan and Whitten, 2005; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi,
2005). One of the reasons for the increasing popularity
of these instruments is the realization that markets may
achieve a more targeted and therefore more cost-efficient
correction of a conservation problem, in particular be-
cause landowners have more information about their local
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costs and can choose the allocation of conservation mea-
sures accordingly (Jack et al., 2008). Another reason is
that market-based instruments are well suited for target-
ing multiple ecosystem services (e.g. conservation and car-
bon sequestration (Nelson et al., 2008)), a point which has
been highlighted in a recent statement of the European
Union (EU-Commission, 2007).
At the same time, however, there has been considerable
concern over whether current implementations of conserva-
tion markets target the right entities. At present, market-
based policies for conservation tend to use simple and indi-
rect incentives, such as payments for certain farming prac-
tices (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002). But are those incentives
efficient in protecting threatened species, or are we paying
"money for nothing" (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006)? Ex-
amining the structure of the given incentives for landown-
ers is the key to answering these questions. What defines a
unit of conservation? What are we paying landowners for?
The overall goal of global conservation efforts is to ensure
the persistence of biodiversity in our landscapes (Margules
and Pressey, 2000). Therefore, it would be ideal to assess
the market value of a conservation measure directly by as-
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sessing its effect on species survival (Williams and Araujo,
2000; Bruggeman and Jones, 2008). Unfortunately, apply-
ing this method to real-world situations is often not feasi-
ble because direct monitoring or detailed population mod-
els are too expensive or not available (Jack et al., 2008).
Moreover, the efficiency of markets crucially depends on
the information available to landowners. If landowners do
not understand the evaluation criteria for their land, they
may choose suboptimal land configurations, or they may
decide not to participate in the market at all. Therefore,
practically all existing market schemes use a metric, given
by a number of indices, that relates measurable quantities
of a site (e.g. size) to the site’s market value.
Most of these existing schemes (e.g. habitat banking in
the US) base their evaluation solely on the quality and
size of the local site without considering its surroundings.
This raises some concern because in many cases, the eco-
logical value of a typical private property (e.g. arable field,
forest lot) does in fact depend on neighboring properties.
Populations or ecosystems may exhibit thresholds for the
effectiveness of conservation measures, which implies that
a local measure may be ineffective when it is not accom-
panied by other measures. (Hanski et al., 1996; Scheffer
et al., 2001). Furthermore, for many endangered species,
not only the absolute loss of habitat area, but also habi-
tat fragmentation is a major cause of population decline
(compare e.g. Saunders et al., 1991; Fahrig, 2002). There-
fore, metrics that only evaluate sites locally may set the
wrong incentives because they do not correspond to the
real conservational value of a site.
Spatial metrics that consider the surrounding of a site
are available and are widely used for systematic reserve
site selection (e.g. Moilanen, 2005; van Teeffelen et al.,
2006). Yet, simply transferring spatial metrics from con-
servation planning into connectivity dependent incentives
for landowners (in the following we will call such incentives
short "spatial incentives") would be short sighted. Conser-
vation planning metrics have been developed for assessing
and optimizing the ecological value of a habitat network
from the viewpoint of a planner who considers the whole
landscape. Landowners in conservation markets, on the
other hand, react to the given incentives independently
and with limited knowledge, striving for maximization of
their individual utility rather than maximizing global wel-
fare. The fact that the value of a site depends on neighbor-
ing sites implies that land use decisions may create costs
or benefits for neighboring landowners. In economics, such
costs or benefits are referred to as externalities. It is well
known that markets may fail to deliver an optimal alloca-
tion of land use in the presence of such externalities (Mills,
1980). Another problem is that, unless we assume per-
fect information and unlimited intellectual capacities, we
must take into account that landowners may fail to find
the optimal adoption of their land use in the presence of
complicated spatial evaluation rules (Hartig and Drechsler,
submitted). Thus, the need to consider human behavior in
metrics for market-based instruments is characterized by
a trade-off: Ecological accuracy calls for a metric that is
complex enough to capture all details of the relevant eco-
logical processes, but socio-economic reality may suggest
compromises towards more practical and robust metrics.
In this paper, we combine a spatially explicit population
model with an agent-based simulation model to assess the
effect of connectivity-dependent incentives in a virtual con-
servation market. One key assumption is that landown-
ers do not react optimally to the given incentives, but
base their decisions only on the present land configura-
tion and their estimated costs and benefits for the next
period. Thus, we seek to optimize for ecological parame-
ters such as dispersal as well as for economic parameters
such as behavior of landowners. To simulate the reac-
tions of landowners towards a given spatial metric, we use
the conservation market model introduced in (Hartig and
Drechsler, submitted). A spatially explicit metapopula-
tion model is placed on top of the emerging landscape
structure to evaluate the conservation success for differ-
ent species in terms of survival probability at a fixed time
horizon.
2. Methods
2.1. Overview and purpose
The aim of this study is to design spatial incentives
that result in cost-effective conservation when there are
many landowners and the conservation outcome depends
on the combination of decisions by landowners. Here, cost-
effective means that we maximize the conservation effect
at a given budget. The model used contains two submod-
els: An economic submodel that simulates the trading of
conservation credits and an ecological submodel to assess
the viability of several species in the dynamic landscape
that emerges from the trading activity. The driver for
trading and the subsequent change of the landscape con-
figuration is economic change in the region, reflected by
heterogeneously changing costs of maintaining a local site
in a conserved state. We first describe the state variables
of the model, followed by the economic and the ecological
submodel and the coupling of the submodels. The cou-
pled model is then used to find the cost-effective metric
by comparing the forecasted species persistence across a
range of different parameterizations of the metric. Fig. 1
shows a graphical representation of our model approach.
2.2. State variables and scales
The simulation is conducted on a rectangular 30 × 30
grid with periodic boundary conditions (i.e. the grid has
the topology of a torus). The n = 302 grid cells repre-
sent both the economic (property) units and the ecologi-
cal (habitat) units. Although the model may be applied
to any spatial and temporal scale, we think of grid cells as
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Figure 1: Modelling approach: Drivers are spatially heterogeneous,
dynamic costs for each site. On the basis of these costs and the spa-
tial incentives, conservation measures are allocated by the economic
submodel. The resulting dynamic landscape is used as an input for
the ecological model, which estimates species survival probabilities
on this landscape.
being of the size of an average agricultural field in Europe
(around 10 ha), and time steps being a year. Grid cells xi
occur in two states: They can be conserved at a cost ci
and thus provide habitat for the species, or they are used
for other economic purposes, resulting in no costs. The
conservation state of a grid cell is labelled with σi, σi = 1
being a conserved cell and σi = 0 being an unconserved
cell. Conserved grid cells may be either occupied (popu-
lated) pi = 1 or unoccupied pi = 0 by the species under
consideration. Unconserved grid cells can never be occu-
pied. A list of the state variables and parameters of the
two submodels is given in Table 1.
2.3. Economic model
The economic model describes the decisions of landown-
ers to establish, maintain, or quit a conservation measure
on their land (grid cell) in each period. Landowners de-
cisions are based on whether conservation or alternative
land use generates a higher return. The returns on the
two land use types are influenced by dynamic, spatially
heterogeneous costs for conserving a grid cell and by the
metric of the conservation market, which decides on the
amount of conservation credits to be earned with a par-
ticular site, and by the current market price for conserva-
tion credits. The model is designed as a spatially explicit,
agent-based partial equilibrium model (compare Drechsler
and Wätzold, in press; Hartig and Drechsler, submitted).
A conserved grid cell xi produces a certain amount of con-
servation credits ξi depending on the number of conserved
grid cells in its neighborhood. We use the following metric
Symbol Connotation Range
State variables:
xi Position of the i-th cell on the grid
σi(t) Conservation state of the i-th cell {0, 1}
pi(t) Population state of the i-th cell {0, 1}
ci(t) Opportunity costs of σi = 1 at t around 1
Parameters economic model:
∆ Cost heterogeneity [0..1]
ω Cost correlation [0..∞]
m Connectivity weight [0..1]
l Connectivity length [0..∞]
λ Budget constraint [0..∞]
Parameters ecological model:
e Local extinction risk [0..1]
r Emigration rate [0..∞]
rd Emigration rate after destruction [0..∞]
α−1 Dispersal distance [0..∞]
Table 1: List of state variables (top), parameters of the economic
model (middle) and parameters of the ecological model (bottom).
Note that although we omit to denote the time dependence (t) ex-
plicitly throughout the main text, all state variables and expressions
derived from state variables are time dependent.
to determine ξi:
ξi = (1−m) +m · ζi(l) . (1)
The first term 1 − m is independent of the connectivity
and may be seen as a base reward for the conserved area.
The parameter m is a weighting factor that determines
the importance of connectivity compared to area. The
second term m · ζ(l) includes the connectivity of the site,
measured by the proportion of conserved sites within a
circle of radius l:
ζi(l) =
∑
dij<l
σj
 ·
∑
dij<l
1
−1 . (2)
Here, dij refers to the distance between the focal cell xi
and another cell xj . Fig. 2 shows a graphical illustration
of this connectivity measure. The total amount of credits
in the market is given by the sum of ξi over all conserved
grid cells:
U =
n∑
i=1
σiξi . (3)
The conservation of a site results in costs that differ among
grid cells. Conservation costs may vary over space and
time (Ando et al., 1998; Polasky et al., 2008). We use
three different algorithms to generate pattern of random
dynamic costs ci(t). All algorithms create average costs of
1, but they differ in the spatial and temporal distribution
of costs. Algorithm 1 generates spatially and temporally
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uncorrelated random costs by drawing from a uniform dis-
tribution of width 2∆ at each time step. Algorithm 2
creates spatially uncorrelated, but temporally correlated
costs by applying on each grid cell a random walk of maxi-
mum step length ∆ together with a small rebounding effect
that pushes costs towards 1 with strength ω. Algorithm 3
creates spatio-temporally correlated costs, using a random
walk of maximum step length ∆ combined with a spatial
correlation term that pushes costs with strength ω towards
the average costs in the neighborhood. A mathematical
description of the three algorithms is given in appendix A,
together with figures of the created cost distributions (Fig.
7 and Fig. 8).
To simulate trading, we introduced a market price P for
credits. The benefits to be earned by a site are given by
P · ξ where ξ is the amount of credits to be earned by a
site (eq. 1). Based on his costs and the potential benefits,
each landowner decides whether to conserve his land or
not. The model has two options for determining the equi-
librium price of the market: Either the price is adjusted
until a certain target level for the total amount of pro-
duced conservation credits U (eq. 3) is met, or the price
is adjusted until a certain level of aggregated costs for the
conservation is reached. By aggregated costs, we mean the
sum of the costs of all conserved sites:
C =
n∑
i=1
σici . (4)
Fixing the target reflects a situation where the quantity of
conservation credits is fixed. This is, for example, the case
in a tradable permit scheme. Fixing the costs, on the other
hand, could correspond to a payment scheme where a con-
servation agency buys credits until a budget constraint is
reached. The two options differ when global properties of
the cost distribution, such as the mean, change over time.
In our simulation, however, costs are in a steady state
that is normalized to a mean of 1. Thus, both options
are approximately identical except for finite size effects,
which would disappear in the limit of an infinitely large
landscape. We chose the second option of fixing the bud-
get for the analysis because it allows an easier comparison
between different metrics. Appendix B.1 gives a detailed
description of the scheduling of the economic model.
2.4. Ecological model
To evaluate conservation success in the emerging dy-
namic landscapes, we use a stochastic metapopulation model
(Hanski, 1998, 1999). Each conserved grid cell is treated as
a habitat patch, meaning that each grid cell may hold a lo-
cal population of the species. Local populations produce
emigrants which may disperse and establish a new local
population on an unoccupied cell. At the same time, local
populations are subject to local extinction, which may be
Focal
site
l
Figure 2: Illustration of the connectivity measure: The connectivity
ζi(l) is the fraction of conserved sites within a circle of radius l of
the focal site
caused e.g. by demographic or environmental stochastic-
ity. The population as a whole can persist on the land-
scape if the average recolonization rate is higher than the
average local extinction risk, yet, stochastic fluctuations
of the number of occupied patches may eventually cause
extinction of the whole metapopulation. The better the
connectivity among patches, and the more patches in the
network, the lower the probability of such a global extinc-
tion.
Local extinctions are modelled by a constant chance e of
each local population to go extinct per time step. The
amount of dispersers arriving from a source patch xj at a
target patch xi is given by the following dispersal kernel:
pij = r · 1∑
i σi − 1
· e−α·dij , (5)
where r is the emigration rate, the term (
∑
i σi − 1)−1
divides the number of dispersing individuals by the avail-
able habitat patches, and the exponential term describes
mortality risk during dispersal as a function of distance
between xi and xj . If a patch has been destroyed at the
current time step, we set the emigration rate to rd, assum-
ing that a proportion of rd of the population will be able
to disperse before destruction. The sum of all arriving im-
migrants according to eq. 5 (truncated to 1) is taken as
the probability that this patch is colonized at the current
time step. Appendix B.2 gives a detailed description of
the scheduling of the ecological model.
2.5. Parametrization and analysis of the model
Different species have different connectivity require-
ments depending on their dispersal abilities. Therefore,
we expect an optimized spatial metric to reflect this by
values of the connectivity weight m and the connectivity
length l that are related to the species characteristics r, rd
and α. Additionally, optimal values for m and l may be
affected by economic conditions, i.e. the distribution of
conservation costs. To analyze the effect of species char-
acteristics and the cost distribution on the optimal spatial
incentive, we varied both the connectivity weight m and
the connectivity length l of the metric eq. 1 for three dif-
ferent cost scenarios and for three different species types.
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The three cost scenarios were generated by Algorithm 1
at ∆ = 0.2, Algorithm 2 at ∆ = 5 · 10−5 and ω = 0.0065,
and Algorithm 3 at ∆ = 0.015 and ω = 0.006. Table 2 dis-
plays a summary of the three scenarios. Remember that
the first scenario creates uncorrelated costs, the second
creates temporally correlated costs and the third scenario
creates spatio-temporally correlated costs. Figs. 7 and 8 in
Appendix A show the spatial and temporal cost distribu-
tion generated by the chosen parameters. For the species,
Cost Scenario Parameters Characteristics
1 - Random ∆ = 0.2 uncorrelated
2 - Random walk ∆ = 5 · 10−5 time correlated
ω = 0.0065
3 - Correlated walk ∆ = 0.015 space and time
ω = 0.006 correlated
Table 2: Overview of the cost scenarios created by the three algo-
rithms.
we consider three functional types: Short-range, interme-
diate and global dispersers. The parametrization for the
three species is displayed in Table 3. To assess the extinc-
tion risk for the species, we ran the simulation with differ-
ent random economic starting conditions between 300 and
1000 times and calculated the probability of a metapopu-
lation extinction after 1000 time steps.
Species type e r rd α−1
I - short dispersal 0.29 3 1 5
II - intermediate dispersal 0.51 3 1 25
III - global dispersal 0.66 3 1 1000
Table 3: Parameter values for the three species types considered.
α−1 is the typical dispersal distance, measured in units of the grid
cell length. With cell lengths of 100 m, this translates to typical
dispersal distances of 0.5 km, 2.5km and 100 km, respectively.
The budget constraint λ for the aggregated costs (eq.
4) was fixed at 0.03 times the number of grid cells n for sce-
narios with cost dynamics generated by the random walk
algorithms (economic scenarios 2 and 3) and at 0.05 times
the number of grid cells n for the scenarios created with the
random algorithm (economic scenario 1). Exceptions are
the combination economic scenario 3 with species 3, where
aggregated costs were set at 0.1 times n and economic sce-
nario 1 with species 3, where aggregated costs were set
at 0.18 times n. The adjustment to different budgets was
done to create similar survival probabilities across the nine
scenarios formed by systematic combination of the three
cost scenarios and the three species types.
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Figure 3: Effect of the connectivity weight m and the connectivity
length l. The pictures show typical landscape structures emerging
from trading with costs being sampled by Algorithm 2 at ∆ = 5 ·
10−5, ω = 0.0065. Conserved sites are colored black, other sites
are colored white. The top row is created with a long connectivity
length (l = 10), the bottom row with a short connectivity length
(l = 1.5). The pictures in the left column are taken at m = 0,
which means that no weight is put on connectivity. Consequently,
the landscape structure is dominated by the sites of lowest costs.
Increasing connectivity weight (m = 0.5 middle, m = 1 right) results
in increasing clustering of conserved sites, but in a smaller total area.
At a connectivity weight of m = 1, meaning that all weight is put on
connectivity, l = 1.5 results in a very dense cluster, while the larger
connectivity length l = 10 results in a more spread out configuration.
3. Results
3.1. Emerging landscapes
For all cost scenarios and all connectivity lengths, an
increase in connectivity weight results in more aggregated
landscape structures. The density of the clustering is con-
trolled by the connectivity length l, which determines how
close patches have to be to be counted as connected. Smaller
connectivity lengths (l ∼ 1.5, corresponding to the direct
8-cell neighborhood) result in very dense clusters at full
connectivity weight, while larger connectivity lengths lead
to more loose agglomerations of conserved sites. Due to
the spatial cost heterogeneity, there is a trade-off between
clustering and area: At a fixed budget, a higher connec-
tivity weight results in lower total area, but with higher
clustering. Typical landscapes are displayed in Fig. 3.
3.2. Optimal incentive
To find the most effective spatial metric (m, l), we var-
ied connectivity weight between 0 and 1 and connectivity
length between 1.5 and 9.5 in 11 linear steps. Note that
a conservation market with no spatial trading rules corre-
sponds to a value of m = 0. The resulting survival prob-
abilities after 1000 years for the three cost scenarios and
the three species types are shown in Fig. 4. The results
show that a short disperser such as species I may gain sub-
stantially from a very high connectivity weight and short
to medium connectivity lengths, while globally dispersing
species such as species III benefit from a low connectivity
5
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Figure 4: Survival probability as a function of connectivity weight
(x-axis) and connectivity length (y-axis) for the three species types
(columns 1-3) and for three cost scenarios (rows 1-3). Dark values
represent high survival probabilities. The gray circles mark the seven
combinations of m, l that yielded the highest survival probabilities,
with larger circle size indicating a better ranking within these seven
combinations. For most of the scenarios, these optimal points cluster
in one small area of the parameter range. The uncertainty of the
survival probability can be estimated from a binomial error model.
Typical values of the absolute standard error are in the order of
0.01. This explains why there is some remaining spread of the best
combinations of m, l when m ' 0 is favored (meaning that l has
little influence on the model) or when survival probabilities are very
similar within a larger area of (m, l).
weight and are relatively insensitive towards the connec-
tivity length. For intermediate species such as species II,
the tendency changes depending on the cost scenario. An
exception is the cost scenario 1 with random costs, which
requires very high connectivity weight and short connec-
tivity lengths for all species. We will discuss the reasons
for this in the next subsection.
3.3. Interpretation of the results
The observed influence of the cost scenarios on the ef-
fectiveness of the applied metric (m, l) suggests that the
emerging landscapes differ among the different cost sce-
narios. To analyze this difference, we plotted landscape
connectivity as well as turnover (the fraction of conserved
sites that are destroyed and recreated elsewhere per time
step) as a function of the metric parameters m and l for
the three considered cost scenarios (Fig. 5).
The results show that greater temporal randomness in
the costs causes higher turnover, in that landowners switch
rapidly between conserving and not conserving. This in-
crease in turnover effectively increases the local extinc-
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Figure 5: Resulting mean connectivity and turnover for the three
cost scenarios as a function of connectivity weight m and connectiv-
ity length l. Connectivity is measured as the mean of ζ(1.5) of all
conserved sites. Turnover, the fraction of conserved sites that are
destroyed and recreated elsewhere per time step, serves as an esti-
mate for the intensity of landscape dynamics. Dark values represent
low turnover and high connectivity, respectively.
tion risk, because local populations go extinct at the de-
stroyed sites, while the remaining subpopulations can not
immediately recolonize the new sites. Creating connected
patches leads to more stability, as neighborhood benefits
may outweigh the individual variation in cost for a cell.
Thus we are not only facing a trade-off between area and
connectivity, but a trade-off between area, connectivity
and turnover. The latter explains why different economic
scenarios lead to different optimal metrics: For random
costs as in scenario 1, turnover rates are very sensitive to
the chosen spatial metric. Consequently, turnover totally
dominates species survival and high connectivity weight is
favored for all species because it reduces the turnover rate.
In contrast, the spatial metric hardly affects turnover for
scenario 2 and scenario 3. Here, the optimization results
(Fig. 4) only reflect the trade-off between connectivity
and area: Short range dispersers require high connectivity
weights, while global dispersers prefer larger areas.
3.4. Multiple-species optimization
Assuming that all three species defined in Table 3 share
the same habitat, but do not interact, we can also use our
model to generate recommendations on how to support all
three species at the same time. There are several options
available to combine the survival of multiple species into
one index (Nicholson and Possingham, 2006; Hartig and
Drechsler, 2008). Here, we use two common indices. The
first is the expected number of surviving species, which is
6
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Figure 6: Expected number of surviving species (right) and probabil-
ities of all species surviving (left) for the spatio-temporally correlated
costs of scenario 3. The gray circles mark the seven combinations
of m, l which yielded the highest score of the applied measure, with
larger circle size indicating a better ranking within these seven com-
binations.
given by the sum of the survival probabilities of all species.
The second index is the probability of all species surviv-
ing, given by the product of the survival probabilities of
all species. As for the single species case, both indices
were calculated for a time horizon of 1000 years. Fig. 6
shows the resulting scores for the spatio-temporally corre-
lated cost scenario. Both objectives suggest a moderately
strong connectivity weight around m = 0.8 and a small
connectivity length around 3.
4. Discussion
4.1. Main findings
We presented a coupled ecological-economic model to
optimize spatial incentives in a market for conservation
credits. The model shows that conservation markets that
consider connectivity lead to considerably better conserva-
tion results than markets without spatial incentives (rep-
resented by m = 0 in Fig.4). Generally, we find that short
dispersing species do best with a high weight on connec-
tivity and small-scale connectivity measures. Global dis-
persers, being largely insensitive to the spatial arrange-
ment of conservation measures, do better with a low weight
on connectivity, because this allows the creation of more
conserved sites within the given budget. When conserving
all species together, a relatively high weight on connec-
tivity yields robustly the highest joint survival probability
(Fig 6). This shows once more that, if connectivity is
relevant for the species of concern, spatial evaluation rules
may considerably improve the cost-effectiveness of market-
based instruments.
Besides species characteristics, the economic scenarios had
an additional, and in some cases large, influence on the op-
timal spatial metric. The reason is that in the presence of
dynamic conservation costs, the spatial incentive does not
only influence landscape connectivity, but also landscape
dynamics (Fig 5). Landscape dynamics, measured by the
rate of turnover (the fraction of conserved sites that are de-
stroyed and recreated elsewhere per time step), negatively
affects species survival because the reallocation of a con-
served site effectively increases the local extinction risk of
the species. In most cases, turnover was negatively corre-
lated with connectivity weight and clustering (Fig 5). The
latter explains why under cost scenario 1 (uncorrelated
random costs), a stronger connectivity weight is favored
for all species: The spatio-temporally uncorrelated costs
of this scenario lead to very high turnover rates under a
low connectivity weight. Consequently a high connectivity
weight that limits the amount of turnover rates is favored
for all species.
4.2. Generality of the results and future research
The ecological model used for this study neglects a
number of factors frequently studied in population models:
The landscape is ecologically homogeneous and we have
included neither local population dynamics nor a possible
dependence of local extinction risk and dispersal on the
local population size, nor did we consider correlated envi-
ronmental stochasticity or catastrophic events. Analyzing
the consequences of these factors on the cost-effectiveness
of metrics for market-based instruments is a matter of fu-
ture research. If required all these factors could easily be
included without changing the rest of the model, includ-
ing the analysis method. Furthermore, more sophisticated
policies and economic models could be introduced without
changing the ecological model.
The main findings of this paper, however, i.e. the posi-
tive effect of relatively simple spatial incentives as opposed
to no spatial incentives, will qualitatively hold for most
realistic scenarios where dispersal is a limiting factor for
species. We recommend testing these ideas more often in
real-world market schemes such as the examples discussed
by Chomitz et al. (2006) or Drechsler et al. (2007).
The most apparent shortcoming of the model at this point
are simplifications with respect to the time dimension, in
particular the inclusion of temporal incentives such as min-
imum durations of conservation measures on the economic
side and time lags for recreation of habitat due to suc-
cession on the ecological side. It seems promising for fu-
ture research to study the control of landscape dynamics
through temporal incentives, either independently or in
connection with spatial incentives.
4.3. Consequences for conservation policy
We believe that our results contain three important
messages for conservation policy. The first is that the in-
clusion of spatial incentives may provide a substantial effi-
ciency gain for conservation markets when fragmentation
is a crucial factor for the populations under consideration.
Our simulations show that it is possible to account for com-
plicated spatial ecological and economic interactions with
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relatively simple spatial incentives. Given that most exist-
ing market-based conservation schemes worldwide do not
explicitly account for spatial processes, it seems promis-
ing to examine the potential efficiency gains that could be
realized by applying spatially explicit metrics for market-
based conservation.
The second message is that market-based instruments are
likely to produce dynamic landscapes, because a voluntary
market is based on the possibility that landowners with-
draw from conservation measures while others step in for
them. This is not a problem in itself. A moderate amount
of landscape dynamics may sometimes even benefit the
conservation objective. Yet, landscape dynamics must be
considered in the design of marked-based instruments and
in underlying ecological models. Neglecting dynamics may
lead to severe problems for the ecological effectiveness of
a market scheme.
The third message is that optimal spatial incentives are
not context-free. The effectiveness of a spatial metric may
be sensitive to the economic situation to which it is ap-
plied. Thus, a thorough examination of both the ecological
as well as the economic and social background is required
before deciding on spatial incentives for market-based in-
struments.
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Appendices
A. Cost algorithms
Alg. 1 creates random, spatially and temporally un-
correlated costs by drawing the costs of each cell for each
time step from a uniform distribution of width 2∆. The
scheduling within one time step is as follows:
Algorithm 1 Random Costs
1: for all cells do
2: ci(t) = random[1−∆ · · · 1 + ∆]
3: end for
Alg. 2 applies a random walk to each grid cell, but has
no interaction between grid cells. As a result, we get a
temporal correlation of the costs of each grid cell (Fig. 8),
but a spatially random pattern (Fig. 7). To constrain the
random walk around 1, an additional rebounding factor of
ω ·√|1− ci(t− 1)| was added to the random walk. The
scheduling within one time step is as follows:
Algorithm 2 Random Walk
1: for all cells do
2: ci(t) = ci(t − 1) + ∆ · random[−1 · · · 1]
+ ω · sign(1− ci(t− 1)) ·
√|1− ci(t− 1)|
3: end for
Alg. 3 applies a random walk with an additional spatial
interaction to each grid cell. It produces spatio-temporally
correlated costs (Fig. 8 and Fig. 7). The scheduling within
one time step is as follows:
Algorithm 3 Correlated Random Walk
1: Calculate average global costs
2: for all cells do
3: c¯i = average costs in the 8-cell neighborhood
4: ci(t) = ci(t− 1) + ∆ · random[−1 · · · 1] + ω · c¯i
5: Normalize with average global costs
6: end for
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Figure 7: Spatial cost distributions generated by the random walk
algorithms (Alg. 2 and 3). The two figures shows the 30 × 30 grid
cells with high cost cells in light and low cost cells in dark colors.
The left figure was created by the random walk (algorithm 2) at
∆ = 5 · 10−5, ω = 0.0065, to the right the correlated random walk
(algorithm 3) at ∆ = 0.015, ω = 0.006. Note that low and high cost
areas are clustered for the correlated random walk.
B. Model Scheduling
B.1. Economic Model
The economic model is initialized with a random con-
figuration which is at the desired cost level. To ensure that
the random walks are in a steady state, we ran the sim-
ulation 10000 time steps before the ecological model was
initialized. Each time step, the scheduling was as follows:
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Figure 8: Time series of the costs of a grid cell over time. Algorithm
1 which changes costs randomly at each time step creates a strongly
fluctuating time series. The two random walk algorithms lead to a
time-correlated series.
Algorithm 4 Scheduling Economic Model
1: Update costs
2: repeat
3: Adjust market price P
4: for all cells do
5: if P · ξi(l) > ci(t) then
6: xi = 1 (conserved)
7: else
8: xi = 0 (not conserved)
9: end if
10: end for
11: Calculate ecological value and costs
12: until budget constraint is met
13: Update land configuration
B.2. Ecological Model
The ecological model was started by randomly choosing
60% of the patches as occupied. We checked that popula-
tions were in a steady state after initialization and thus the
measurements were not affected by the initialization (see
Grimm and Wissel, 2004). The scheduling of the ecological
model within one time step is as follows:
Algorithm 5 Scheduling Metapopulation Model
1: for all populated cells do
2: Local extinction with rate e
3: end for
4: for all populated cells do
5: if Patch destroyed then
6: Disperse with emigration rate rd
7: else
8: Disperse with emigration rate r
9: end if
10: end for
11: for all unpopulated cells do
12: Check if immigration succesfull
13: end for
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